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The  paper  studies  the  relations  between  types  of  institutions  on  different 
components  of  human  development.  A  role  of  aggregate  demand  in  determining  the 
material components of human development is assumed. We thus divide institutions into 
those  that  create  demand  and  those  that  are  determined  by  the  whole  process  of 
development. Similarly we divide human development in its three traditional components 
(economic development, health, knowledge). Both human development and institutions 
are assumed as multidimensional constructs; all the main components of these constructs 
are defined as latent variables, and the relations between them as structural relations. A 
Partial  Least  Squares  (PLS)  path  model  is  developed:  it  is  the  aggregation  (and 
simultaneous estimation) of an outer model relating observed or manifest variables to 
their  own  latent  variable  and  of  a  structural  model  (inner  model)  relating  some 
endogenous latent variable to other latent variables. From the goodness of fit point of 
view, our results seem to validate our theoretical assumptions.  
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1. Introduction  
The influence of institutions on the development of a society seems to imply a 
multitude of complex relations between  social, political and institutional phenomena 
which for their inner nature cannot be forced in the traditional framework of a production 
function. 
In particular, in structuring our model we take distances from three main features 
of the theoretical traditional framework: 
i)  the assumed irrelevance of aggregate demand;  
ii)  the identification of material output with the degree of development;  
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iii)  the tendency to study economic relations in terms of simple and general 
quantitative relation between one directly observable endogenous variable, 
and one or more (directly observable) exogenous variables.  
To overcome the difficulties posed by the assumption of irrelevance of aggregate 
demand in the growth process we distinguish between economic and political institutions. 
The former are essentially those which directly or indirectly create aggregate demand and 
positively affect the level of output.  The latter are instead a consequence of the existence 
of Economic Institutions and positively affect the different components of development.  
To bypass the rigidities imposed by the identification between development and 
material output  we define human development as a multidimensional phenomenon. This 
is consistent with UNDP’s definition of the Human Development Index (HDI). However 
– unlike HDI - we define its components (Economic Development, Knowledge, Health) 
as latent variables (LV), that is variables that cannot be observed and measured directly.  
To  study  the  relations  between  the  different  institutions  and  the  different 
components  of  human  development  we  make  use  of  a  Structural  Equations  Model 
(SEM), that is a model in which there is more than one endogenous/dependent variable 
and more than one relation to estimate. 
The general features of SEM models seem to overcome some of the limits of the 
third  traditional  feature  we  outlined  above  (point  iii.).  The  effects  of  Institutions  on 
Development involve relations in which quantitative phenomena - such as the level of 
investment, consumption,  GDP etc.  - and qualitative phenomena - such as the degree of 
development  of  political  institutions  or  the  level  of  education  or  health  -  are  deeply 
intertwined.  Their relations need to be represented – and estimated – as a network of 
causal relationships. Moreover, the qualitative phenomena – that in statistical language 
can  be  defined  as  latent  multidimensional  constructs  –  can  be  expressed  as  latent 
variables, and measured by means of observed indicators. This is precisely what  SEM 
are designed for:  to estimate a network of causal relationships, defined according to a 
theoretical model, linking two or more latent complex concepts, each measured through a 
number of observable indicators.
2  
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These are precisely the key features of our approach. It is original from the point 
of view of the theoretical relations and principles adopted, as well as from that of the 
econometric method used in the empirical analysis.  
An important feature of our analysis, that needs to be stressed, is that we do not 
study the effects of Institutions on Human Development (effects  that could be studied – 
and have been studied
3 -  by means of a simple regression model of one composite 
indicator that represents Human Development and one or more composite indicators that 
represent Institutions ) but instead the causal effects of the different types of institutions 
on different components of human development.  Having defined our multidimensional 
components  of  institutions  or  of  human  development  as  latent  variables,  and  being 
interested  in  the  estimation  of  more  than  one  causal  relation  the  choice  of  structural 
equation modeling (SEM) is a necessary – although original -  choice. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the first part (sections 2-5) we develop 
critical considerations on the relevant literature. It does not claim to be a complete and 
detailed critical survey, but merely an attempt to highlight the features of the literature 
that led us to take up original stances in structuring our analysis.  The analysis of the 
literature leads us also to define (sections 6 and 7) causal relations between the latent 
variables; then, using a structural equations model (sections 8, 9, 10)  we define, estimate 
and validate the model. As we conclude in section 11, the results of the empirical analysis 
are consistent with the model which stems from theoretical framework. 
2. The general conception of productive process in “mainstream” economic theories 
The  whole  corpus  of  theoretical  analysis  of  economic  growth  derives  from 
marginalist or neoclassical theories of value and distribution. As such, it is based on the 
notion of production function and thus on a particular vision of the productive process. In 
this view, all the material or immaterial, naturally available or produced elements used in 
production are conceived of as productive factors which can be combined in varying 
proportions in the productive process. These combinations give origin to corresponding 
levels of output at the individual firm or aggregate level. The production function is thus 
conceived  of  as  a  simple  and  general  functional  relation  between  the  quantities  of 
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productive  factors  and  the  corresponding  quantity  of  output  realized.  This  relation  is 
simple because it univocally links given quantities of factors and defined quantities of 
output. It is general because it holds in circumstances which in principle may differ for 
historical, institutional, social and political reasons.  
This vision of the productive process lies at the very heart of the “mainstream” 
theories of prices and distribution. The claim that market economies show an automatic 
tendency towards full employment equilibria and the irrelevance of aggregate demand in 
determining the long-term level of output are necessary implications of this vision of the 
productive process.  
3. Three key features of the traditional analyses of growth 
 The modern theory of growth begins in the 1950s with Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956). They studied the determinants of economic growth by elaborating an aggregate 
production  function.  Automatic  market  mechanisms,  they  argued,  would  lead  the 
economy on a full-employment steady–state path of growth in which the rate of growth is 
determined  by  the  rate  of  growth  of  population  and  by  the  rate  of  growth  of  labor 
productivity determined by technological progress. The influence of any phenomenon on 
aggregate  income  is  possible  only  as  far  as  it  affects  aggregate  supply.  In  recent 
reformulations many further factors affecting growth have been studied, these analyses 
did not modify the traditional vision of the productive process: the effects on growth of 
all different phenomena considered (and institutions between them) have necessarily to 
pass through changes in the shape or level of the production function.  
We  focus  our  attention  on  three  crucial  features  which  derive  from  the 
marginalist conception of the productive process which underlies the whole corpus of 
mainstream theories of growth. 
The first of these features is that the whole approach is based on the implicit 
assumption that the expansion of aggregate demand does not play any positive role in 
determining the growth process. The production function can be seen as the centre of the 
analysis because aggregate supply – it is assumed – always finds its aggregate demand. 
The only conditions to be studied in order to explain growth are those affecting aggregate 
supply.  5 
 
A second feature on which our attention will be focused is that in this traditional 
approach  the  level  of  development  of  an  economy,  its  temporal  trend  and,  more  in 
general,  the  level  of  wellbeing  of  a  society,  tend  to  be  identified  with  exclusively 
quantitative magnitudes: respectively with the level of aggregate GDP, its rate of growth 
and its per capita level.  
Finally  a  third  feature  is  the  way  in  which  institutional,  political  and  social 
phenomena affecting development are studied in the literature. The process of growth is 
conceived of as essentially determined by technological phenomena (technical innovation 
or more in general changes in the shape of the aggregate production function) and by the 
development of the available quantities of productive factors. Its analysis has to be based 
on the production function a simple and general relation between quantitative observable 
variables. In this conception it is thus difficult to find any role for the wide set of social, 
institutional,  conventional,  political  and  juridical  phenomena  which  cannot,  owing  to 
their intrinsic nature, be represented by means of merely quantitative relations and as 




4.  The  debate  on  the  key  features:  The  role  of  aggregate  demand,  development 
economics as a separate branch of economics and the issue of the adequacy of GDP 
as a measure of well–being  
The first of these crucial features – the claim of a long-term tendency towards full 
employment and the irrelevance of aggregate demand expansion in the growth process – 
is the most fundamental one. It has been questioned since the very beginning of the 
analysis of growth, and theories in which aggregate demand determines growth have 
been parallel developed since then. These theories represent a very limited portion of the 
literature on growth
4 and have not yet been assumed as reference for an analysis of the 
relation between institutions and development.   
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  Conversely, the other two features have directly or indirectly generated a wide 
range of criticisms and elaboration both in theoretical and empirical analyses.  
The  study  of  economic  development  was  the  field  of  analysis,  in  which 
discomfort for the substantial irrelevance of a social, institutional, conventional, political 
and juridical phenomena on the process of growth appeared.  Although at the cost of 
gross simplification it is actually possible to conceive the whole corpus of development 
economics  as  an  integration  of  the  theory  of  growth  deriving  from  the  attempt  to 
overcome the limitations that this alleged irrelevance imposed on the ability of the theory 
to interpret reality.  
When countries that are not industrially developed are taken into consideration, a 
multitude of phenomena that are hard to include in the approach based on the production 
function  appear  to  play  an  unquestionable  role.  Development  economics  has  been 
developed  as  if  these  phenomena  were  relevant  in  less  developed  countries,  where 
markets are not complete, information is limited, deep structural changes are still taking 
place,  etc.  So,  although  without  questioning  the  traditional  approach,  models  and 
theoretical analyses which go beyond the simple use of aggregate production functions 
are worked out.  
In  one  of  the  most  popular  textbooks  of  development  economics,  Todaro  and 
Smith (2006) argue that in addition to all the main topics of “traditional economics”, 
development  economics  “must  deal  also  with  the  economic,  social,  political  and 
institutional mechanisms, both public and private, necessary to bring about rapid …and 
large scale improvements in levels of living .” (p.9) In development economics, they 
argue,  value  premises  are  relevant;  it  is  necessary  to  go  beyond  simple  Economics, 
considering ‘non economic variables’ such as social tradition, religions, attitudes and 
institutions.    
It is thus meaningful that it was within Development Economics that the adequacy 
of GDP as a measure of the well–being of an economy has been questioned. In this 
context,  the  work  of  the  group  of  UN  experts  who,  in  1954,  produced  the  report 
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International Definition and Measurement of Standards and Levels of Living, defined the 
notion of human development. This notion tended to combine per capita income, a purely 
quantitative parameter, with quantities that could take into account different features of 
the actual economic systems, which could essentially be expressed as four dimensions: 
health, education, employment and housing.  
In  the  seventies,  when  Chipman  and  Moore  (1971)  and  Nordhaus  and  Tobin 
(1972) entered this debate, a set of circumstances affecting the well-being of an economy 
but not registered by the GDP and which we find in the current debate on the issue were 
already being recorded. The evaluation of non market goods and services, the evaluation 
of leisure, negative externalities such as pollution, the changes in product quality over 
time, the evaluation of public goods such as parks, police services, national defense, etc.   
Since then, the reflection on a wider measurement of development has offered a 
rich field of analysis. Morris (1979) opened the way to the study of composite indixes of 
economic development able to capture not only per capita income but also the fulfillment 
of basic needs and other possible indicators of well-being. Dasgupta and Weale 1992 
included civil and political rights in the definition of the quality of life and development. 
The work by the Nobel laureate A. Sen radically changed and enhanced the theoretical 
reflection  on  this  point  by  defining  the  notion  of  capability  and  the  concept  of 
development as a freedom. (See Anand and Sen (1994); Sen (1999)).     
This line of critical reasoning finds its most complete expression in the recent 
Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress  by  J.  Stiglitz,  A.  Sen  and  J.P.  Fitoussi  (2009).  As  will  be  shown  in  the 
following, one conclusion of the Report is crucial for our work:  
“To  define  what  well-being  means  a  multidimensional  definition  has  to  be  used…..  [T]he 
Commission has identified the following key dimension that should be taken into account. At 
least in principle, these dimensions should be considered simultaneously: 
i. Material living standards (income, consumption and wealth); 
ii. Health; 
iii. Education; 
iv. Personal activities including work 
v. Political voice and governance; 
vi. Social connections and relationships; 
vii. Environment (present and future conditions); 
viii. Insecurity, of an economic as well as a physical nature. 
All  these  dimensions  shape  people’s  well-being,  and  yet  many  of  them  are  missed  by 
conventional income measures.” (p. 27)  8 
 
 
5. The debate on the key features: endogenous growth theories and  the analysis of 
the relations between institutions and growth   
A second line along which the traditional approach to economic growth has been 
supplemented  in  order  to  overcome  the  alleged  insignificance  of  social,  political, 
institutional phenomena can be found in the endogenous growth models (Romer (1986); 
Lucas (1988); Grossman and Helpman (1991)).  
In these analyses, to the traditional notion of capital, labor and natural resources 
they added other factors different productive factors (e.g. human capital) representing – 
in general sense - the influence of institutional social and political phenomena. Some 
quantitative  magnitudes  univocally  representing  a  specific  phenomenon  are  THUS 
introduced into the production function. Then a specific rule of accumulation of this 
particular  element  is  introduced  in  the  growth  model.  These  theories  however  have 
continued to make use of the traditional vision of a productive process: a production 
function actually remains the focus of any reasoning on growth. In this way, although 
modified, the general conception of productive process is not essentially altered.   
A  similar  reasoning  applies  to  the  analyses  of  the  role  of  institutions  in 
determining growth and human development. In recent literature, the role of institutions 
has generally been treated within the framework of the traditional approach to economic 
growth based on the production function.
5 Institutions have consequently been considered 
as affecting growth only through their effects on the production function.  
In the corpus of this literature the distinction is made between economic, political 
and social institutions. Institutions are considered then a multidimensional phenomenon. 
A meaningful feature of this debate, which we are going to overcome, is that all the 
possible dimensions are considered together either as conditions which affect economic 
development or which are determined by it. We thus find a sort of assumed unitarity of 
all the institutions. The debate is focused on whether economic growth determines the 
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development of broad-based and strong institutions or whether the creation of strong and 
broad-based institutions manages to affect (positively) economic growth.  
Since the seminal contribution of North (1981) and (1990), many other authors 
have argued in favor of a positive effect of institutions on growth. Some of them from a 
strictly empirical point of view, e.g. Knack and Keefer (1995) or Mauro (1995). Others 
followed  a  more  general  approach:  Jones  and  Hall  (1999),  Acemoglu  (2001)  (2002), 
Mokyr (2002), Easterly and Levine (2003), Dollar and Kraay (2003). They generally 
claim  that  ‘democracy’  is  the  basic  element  for  securing  property  rights
6.  In  this 
literature, democracy is conceived of as rules that limit government power. Synthesizing 
this position, Gleaser et al. (2004) talk about “an intellectual consensus that political 
institutions of limited government cause economic growth” p. 272.   
According  to  other  authors,  essentially  Lipset  (1960),  Barro  (1997),  (1999), 
Alvarez et al. (2000),  Djankov et al. (2003) and Glaeser et al. (2004) the causal relation 
has  to  be  reversed.  When  per–capita  income,  physical  and  human  capital  grow, 
conditions of literacy and education also tend to be created. These conditions lead to the 
development  of  democratic  institutions.  This  thesis,  although  less  widespread  among 
economists, tends to be powerful in explaining the processes of development which took 
place under dictatorships which relatively rapidly evolved towards democracy (e.g. South 
Korea, Taiwan and even China).    
As noted in Glaeser, et al. (2004) these two opposite stances share the assumption 
that growth is determined by investments in physical and human capital, so it is essential 
to secure property rights to support investment in physical and human capital. 
7 
The difference between the two approaches lies in the fact that, in the first case, 
this security is determined by the existence of democratic institutions which constrain 
government power, while in the second instance it could also be determined by political 
decisions of – generally unconstrained - leaders of developing countries.  
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7 The debate is also extended to the kind of institutions allowing a better protection of property rights. 
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and La Porta et al. (1999) claim that evolutions of the English Common Law 
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Civil Law system. A similar comparison has been made between different Colonial Origins that gave rise to 
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From our point of view it is important to stress that the influence of institutions on 
the process of growth and development is studied assuming the traditional theoretical 
approach:  democratic  institutions  enforce  property  rights  which  are  essential  in 
automatically  generating  investment  in  physical  and  human  capital  or  in  positively 
affecting so-called total factor productivity. The production function is again  the central 
focus of argument. Institutions – like all the other circumstances considered in traditional 
economic analysis – affect either its arguments or its shape. 
The fact that the influence of institutions on the process of economic development 
has  been  studied  in  the  framework  of  the  traditional  theory  implies  some  limitations 
which  we  consider  to  be  crucial  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  analysis.  This  traditional 
approach to economic growth does not attribute any possible role to aggregate demand 
expansion. Thus any effect of institutions on growth through the expansion of aggregate 
demand cannot be envisaged. The existence of institutions which directly or indirectly 
imply government expenditure is considered as a factor negatively affecting growth and 
development or at most crowding out a corresponding private expenditure. Government 
size is seen as a negative factor.
8 
The centrality of the notion of production function has also had a methodological 
implication in the empirical analyses. This feature has favored the use of simple uni-
equational models between observed variables. This is true for the first phase of empirical 
analyses of growth in which the observable variables represented essentially the available 
quantities of productive factors. The notion of total factor productivity and its empirical 
counterpart (Solow’s residual) represented all the effects of the phenomena which this 
approach was not able to capture.   
The use of simple uni-equational models between observed variables can however 
be also found in the more recent and articulated formulations of the theory of growth. 
Both  in  the  endogenous  growth  theories  and  in  the  quoted  analyses  of  the  relation 
between Institutions and human development, all the causal links between phenomena 
have  been  treated  in  terms  of  simple  and  general  relations  between  quantitative 
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variables: the introduction of the effects of specific phenomena, such as the effects of 
institutions  on  growth  and  then  on  human  development,  is  generally  worked  out  by 
introducing in the production function one or more indicators which aggregate different 
components  to  obtain  a  summary  measure  of  the  specific  phenomenon  under 
consideration.  
6. Our Position and thesis  
All the above critical considerations underpin our position on the relation between 
institutions  and  human  development.  We  assume  human  development  to  be  a 
multidimensional  phenomenon,  composed  of  three  key  dimensions,  to  be  considered 
simultaneously: Economic Development, Knowledge, Health. These are the same three 
components of the Human Development Index (HDI) as defined by UNDP. However, in 
HDI  these  three  components  are  aggregated  to  obtain  a  single  summary  measure; 
moreover,  some  components  are  themselves  multidimensional:  in  this  case  they  are 
defined as linear combination of  indicators  (for example: Knowledge is defined as 
access to knowledge and measured – until 2009 - as a weighted average of adult literacy 
rate  and  gross  enrolment  index;  since  2010  as  a  weighted  average  of  mean  years  of 
schooling  and  expected  years  of  schooling).  Here  instead  we  consider  the  three 
components of human development as theoretical, not directly observable constructs (in 
other words we define them as latent variables), and we don’t aggregate them in a single 
summary measure but instead leave them as separate dimensions. 
Similarly  we  don’t  define  institutions  as  a  single  variable,  but  instead  as  a 
multidimensional theoretical construct that can be split in three  components: Economic 
Institutions, Political Institutions, Social Institutions. We assume these three components 
to be  multidimensional and not directly observable latent variables. 
Our analysis consists in the simultaneous definition of two essential elements of 
the model. On one side we define a set of theoretical relations between the different 
components (latent variables) involved in the relation between institutions and human 
development; on the other we define by means of what (manifest) variables we can obtain 
an aggregate measure of the unobservable components. 12 
 
As  far  as  the  first  step  is  concerned,  our  assumptions  may  be  represented 
graphically  as  in  Figure  1,  where  the  arrows  represent  causal  relations  between  the 


















Figure 1: graphical representation of the relations between latent variables 
 
We  are  departing  from  the  traditional  framework  with  regard  to  some  major 
theoretical and methodological aspects. The most significant theoretical aspect is that, in 
contrast with what is claimed in the traditional approach, we consider aggregate demand 
expansion as a significant determinant of  growth and accumulation.
 9 This leads us to 
wonder how to assign different roles to different sets of institutions in the development 
process. We thus break the unitarity in which institutions are dealt with in literature. 
Some  institutions  necessarily  imply  government  expenditure:  a  well-developed 
and  extensive  welfare  system  or  a  public  health  system  or  the  active  presence  of 
                                                 











Government in the economy as a direct producer of goods or services necessarily imply a 
high level of government expenditure. This implies the existence of levels of aggregate 
demand which are – in a higher or lower degree – irreversible and that possibly tend to 
increase in time.  Assuming a positive role of aggregate demand in the growth process, 
the  institutions  implying  government  expenditure  are  considered  here  as  a  factor 
positively determining output level and its trend over time. Moreover, a positive effect on 
growth and development seems to be exerted by institutions which do not necessarily 
imply  government  expenditure  but  which  tend  to  create  positive  conditions  for  the 
expansion of private investment. This set of institutions can be defined as Economic 
Institutions and must be considered as those directly or indirectly affecting aggregate 
demand.  
Other  institutions  can  be  classified,  following  a  distinction  we  found  in  the 
literature,  as  Political  or  Social  Institutions.  We  distinguish  these  from  Economic 
Institutions because they do not necessarily imply significant government expenditure nor 
tend to directly affect private investment. In the literature, political institutions represent 
the set of rules (formal or informal) determining the way in which political decisions are 
actually taken in a community: the constraints to power of central government and the 
way in which different social, political or ethnical groups are represented in the process 
of political decision.  Social institutions, instead, are generally conceived as the (formal 
or  informal)  rules  determining  the  participation  of  people  to  political  decisions,  civil 
liberties and women’s rights.
10  
The onset and development of both Social and Political Institutions are considered 
here as consequences of the development of Economic Institutions.
11  The assumption of 
a positive role of demand expansion in the material growth process leads us to overcome 
the polarization of the debate: we assume some institutions as cause of growth  and others  
(Social and Political) as the result of the development process as a whole. We thus break 
                                                 
10 We are going to keep these two similar sets of institutions separate firstly because in this we follow the 
literature, but also because we assume an influence of Social Institutions on Knowledge.  
11 In this way we actually follow the general distinction made in the literature between three kinds of 
institutions: Economic, Political and Social Institutions. As stated in the text Economic Institutions are 
conceived  of  and  defined  in  an  original  way  and  different  connections  between  the  three  kinds  of 
institutions are nevertheless assumed.  
 14 
 
the  unitarity  of  the  institutions  in  the  conception  of  the  process  of  development,  by 
assuming that other institutions are essentially determined by the existence and the degree 
of  development  of  Economic  Institutions.  The  latter  then  becomes  crucial  both  for 
material development and for further institutional development. We add further relations 
of  causality:  we  assume  that  Political  Institutions  affect  the  development  of  Social 
Institutions; while the latter have a direct effect on Knowledge.  
As for the definition of human development, we shall follow the main conclusions 
of the literature: we limit the empirical analysis to three multidimensional components: 
Economic  Development,  Knowledge  and  Health,  and  we  consider  –  as  stated  by  J. 
Stiglitz,  A.  Sen  e  J.P.  Fitoussi  (2009)  –    a  definition  of  well-being  in  which  the 
dimensions co-exist. However, unlike the definition of HDI, we do not define a single 
summary measure.  
Moreover  we  establish  a  logical  causal  hierarchy  among  these  components. 
Following  the  traditional  approach  one  might  be  induced  to  consider  the  growth  of 
absolute or per-capita GDP as a quantitative aspect of economic growth which does not 
necessarily generate a simultaneous development of the other dimensions of well–being. 
The distinction between the quantitative dimension of economic development and the 
other dimensions derives from the distinction between what is economic (i.e. treatable by 
means of a production function) and what is non economic and has to be considered as a 
social phenomenon.  
In our view, on the contrary, the process of development and economic growth 
has to be viewed as a single process in which the quantitative growth of GDP cannot take 
place  without  generating  a  parallel  process  of  improvement  of  social  conditions, 
determining Knowledge and Health.  
On  the  other  hand,  in  literature,  the  linkage  between  Knowledge,  Health  and 
Economic  Development  is  generally  mediated  by  the  effect  of  (labor  or  total  factor)  
productivity  being  then  a  supply  effect  on  growth.  The  assumption  of  a  demand-led 
growth point of view led us along the other line of reasoning present in the literature 
which considers these components of well-being as an effect of material development. 
Therefore,  as  already  observed,  while  Economic  Development  –  measured  by 
absolute and per capita GDP - is considered here as directly determined by Economic 15 
 
Institutions  via  the  almost  irreversible  direct  or  indirect  contribution  to  aggregate 
expenditure, the other two dimensions of human development - Health and Knowledge - 
are considered here as necessary consequences of Economic Development.  
We thus have a network of causal relations. We consider Knowledge (K) directly 
affected by Economic Development (E.D.) and by Social Institutions (S.I.) although it is 
also indirectly affected by Economic Institutions (E.I.), which then determine Economic 
Development (E.D.) and Political Institutions (P.I.).     
In  this  way  the  relations  we  are  assuming  between  the  latent  variables  in  the 
model appear to be different from those assumed in the traditional approach:  they are not 
univocal, simple and general quantitative relations between quantity of inputs and the 
aggregate quantity of outputs.  
Limiting  assumptions  are  always  necessary  for  proper  identification  of  the 
structural model from an econometric perspective. These have led us to assume as a first 
step  the  relations  now  described.  As  we  argue  in  the  conclusions,  other  options  are 
certainly possible, also keeping using the two crucial contributions of the paper i.e. the 
leading  role  of  demand  expansion  and  the  method  based  on  the  definition  of  latent 
variables and the development of a PLS path model (PLS-PM). 
7.The formalization of the relations and the PLS model  
Three steps must be taken in order to formalize our model.  In the first place, we 
have to flesh out the theoretical notions utilized. The nature of Economic Institutions, 
Political Institutions, Social Institutions as well as Economic Development, Health and 
Knowledge  will  thus  change  from  that  of  abstract  economic  categories  (theoretical 
constructs)  to  that  of  quantitative  variables  which  -  it  is  hypothesized  -  cannot  be 
observed directly. Evidence may be collected on the levels and mutual interactions of 
these so called latent variables by examining their influence on groups of observable 
variables, thus indirectly describing them by observing one block of manifest variables 
(or indicators) for each latent variable .  
The second step consists in the definition of the causal relations between the latent 
variables using a structural equations model, as in section 6.  16 
 
Finally, a statistical method is applied to the data in order to validate the model 
and to estimate its parameters. The statistical procedure does not assess the causality of 
the relations comprising the model; such an interpretation of the results can derive only 
from the theoretical framework. Note that this is exactly what happens with any statistical 
modeling  procedure:  the  model  stems  from  theoretical  framework,  the  results  can  be 
consistent with the theoretical model – and thus validate the model – or not.
12 
Having defined the theoretical constructs involved in our reasoning as distinct 
latent variables that are assumed to be associated with each other, it seems natural to 
model their interactions by means of a structural equation model. “Structural equations 
models (SEM) include a number  of statistical methodologies meant to estimate a network 
of causal relationships, defined according to a theoretical model, linking two or more 
latent complex concepts, each measured through a number of observable indicators.“ 
(Esposito Vinzi et. al., (2010)). 
In particular, having chosen an exploratory approach, a PLS path model seems to 
be  the  most  suitable.    What  led  us  to  PLS  soft  modeling,  as  opposed  to  Maximum 
Likelihood Structural Equation Models (ML-SEM), is the consideration that ML-SEM, as 
well as other Lisrel–type methods, requires strong assumptions, many observations and 
so-called “hard modeling” procedures. Due to the inherent quality of the cross-border 
data on the topics of institutions and human development, drawn from different sources, 
in  different  years  and  based  on  the  efforts  of  many  public  and  private  organizations 
operating in a variety of social, political, economic and natural environments all over the 
world, the indicators are assumed not to carry the level of standardization and accuracy 
required, nor to fulfill the distributional assumptions and the sample size requirements 
(for PLS the sample size requirements are much smaller). In fact covariance- based SEM  
typically employ a full information ML estimation process; thus  “a poorly developed  
construct where some of the item measures are weak or inappropriately measuring some 
other latent construct or a theoretical model with miss-specified paths can bias other 
estimates throughout the proposed model. PLS being a limited-information component-
based least squares alternative, tends to be less affected.” (W.W. Chin, 2010) .  
                                                 
12 M. Friedman wrote: “Factual evidence can never ‘prove’ a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it, 
which  is  what  we  generally  mean  when  we  say,  somewhat  inexactly,  that  the  hypothesis  has  been 
‘confirmed’ by experience.” Friedman, M. (1953)  (p.9).  17 
 
PLS  is  an  iterative  algorithm  that  solves  out  –  separately  –  the  blocks  of  the 
measurement model and then, in a second step, estimates the path coefficients in the 
structural model. Therefore  it is the aggregation  (and simultaneous estimation) of two 
models: 
1) a measurement model (outer model) relating observed or manifest variables (MV) to 
their own latent variable (LV); 
2) a structural model (inner model) relating some endogenous latent variables to other 
latent variables. 
The estimation of the parameters of the model is performed by a procedure that 
computes LV scores using a PLS algorithm, and then performs Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS)  regressions  on  them  to  estimate  the  structural  equations.  PLS  is  prediction 
oriented: it aims at explaining at best the residual variance of the LV and, potentially, of 
the MV in any regression run in the model. 
Each LV has been defined by means of a reflective measurement model  in which 
each  MV  ( )  is  related  to  its  LV  ( )  by  a  simple 
regression:  
              (1) 
where   has mean zero and is uncorrelated with  . The set of MV linked to a LV is 
called block in path model language. A further assumption is the uni-dimensionality of 
the block; moreover, all the MV are required to be positively correlated.  
  The  reflective  specification  for  the  measurement  model  is  consistent  with  the 
assumption  that  each  MV  reflects  its  LV,  rather  than  vice-versa,  as  in  the  formative 
specification. It is true that usually complex multidimensional indicators such as Human 
Development Index, or the Index of Economic Freedom are defined in a formative way, 
as being generated by their manifest variables as linear combinations of  indicators (MV) 
with  fixed  weights,  but  this  happens  not  for  theoretical  reasons  but  for  estimation 
requirements.  The  opportunity  to  define  the  outer  model  by  means  of  the  reflective 
specification is in fact one of the good features of SEM. 18 
 
On the basis of our theoretical reasoning we define a latent variable Economic 
Institutions which reflects the extent of government intervention in the economy. From 
among the available indicators (MV) we select those able to represent direct government 
intervention in the economy: the levels of general government consumption spending as a 
percentage  of  total  consumption,  transfers  and  subsidies  as  a  percentage  of  GDP, 
government  enterprises  and  investment.  We  also  select  a  set  of  indicators  measuring 
different  aspects  of  government  activity  tending  to  create  the  conditions  for  private 
investment:  protection  of  property  rights,  legal  enforcement  of  contracts,  taxes  on 
international  trade,  regulatory  trade  barriers,  credit  market  regulations,  business 
regulations.  
The other latent variables –  Political Institutions, Social Institutions, Economic 
Development,  Health  and  Knowledge  –  have  been  built  using  the  set  of  manifest 
variables which are generally used in the literature (see in particular Basu (2008)). These 
are indexes built by International Institutions highly specialized in each specific field 
associated to our constructs. In literature, we found a general consensus on the ability of 
these  data  sets  to  represent  the  phenomena  under  consideration.  Although  a  specific 
analysis could reveal many limits of these indexes, entering this issue is far beyond the 
aim of our work. In tables 1, we find the indicators related to each latent variable, their 
source and year of reference.  
In the whole we use 34 indicators for manifest variables. We included in our 
sample all the countries (belonging to HDI 2006 country list) which had no more than 4 
indicators (out of these 34) missing.  
The coverage by tertiles of our sample with respect to the HDI 2006 country list is 
as follows: for the first tertile coverage is of  77.97%; for the second tertile it is of 
62.71%; and for the third tertile the coverage is of 52.54%. 19 
 
 
Tables 1: Measurement models 
Table 1a. Manifest variables for Economic Institutions (E.I.) 
 
Name   Variable   Year  Source  Reversion 
Formula 
Area 1-A  General government consumption spending as a 
percentage of total consumption 
2006  FH-EFW  Max(Area 1-A)  
- Area 1-A 
Area 1-B  Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP  2006  FH- EFW  Max(Area 1-B)  
- Area 1-B 
Area 1-C  Government enterprises and investment   2006  FH- EFW   
Area 2-C  Protection of property rights   2006  FH- EFW   
Area 2-Fd  Legal enforcement of contracts   2006  FH- EFW   
Area 4-A  Taxes on international trade  2006  FH- EFW   
Area 4-B  Regulatory Trade Barriers  2006  FH- EFW   
Area 4-E  International capital market controls  2006  FH- EFW   
Area 5-C  Business Regulations  2006  FH- EFW   
Description: 
There  are  9  manifest  variables  for  Economic  Institutions.  The  indicators  are  a  subset  of  those 
collected by the Freedom House for the calculation of the EFW index. They are named as in the 
published FH-EFW dataset.  
The  first  two  indicators  have  been  reversed  as  they  were  inverse  indicators  of  the  underlying 
variables, giving higher scores to countries with lower levels of the variable. i.e. General government 
consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption. 
 
Table 1b. Manifest variables for Political Institutions (P.I.) 




Political rights  2007  FH  8 – PR 
L1  Lower legislative  2004  POLCON   
L2  Upper legislative  2004  POLCON   
F  Independent sub-federal units  2004  POLCON   
ID  Index of democracy  2000  PRIO   
Polity  Polity score  2005  POLITY   
Exconst  Executive constraint  2005  POLITY   
Description: 
There are 7 manifest variables for Political Institutions. The first, Political Rights, comes from the 
Freedom in the World Annual Report, the Freedom House’s flagship publication. We reversed it 
because it was a inverse indicator.  
The next three indicators are from the POLCON Henisz Dataset, devoted to the calculation of the 
Political Constraint Index. 
The Index of Democracy is part of the Polyarchy dataset , compiled by Tatu Vanhanen (PRIO). 20 
 
The last two indicators are part of the Polity IV project devoted to the evaluation of the political 
regime characteristics. 
Table 1c. Manifest variables for Social Institutions (S.I.) 
Name  Variable  Year  Source  Reversion 
Formula 
PHYSINT  Physical Integrity Index  2007  CIRI   
NEW_E
MPINX 
Empowerment Rights Index  2007  CIRI   
ASSN  Freedom of association  2007  CIRI   
WECON  Women’s economic rights  2007  CIRI   
WOPOL  Women’s political rights  2007  CIRI   
WOSOC  Women’s social rights  2007  CIRI   
Press 
Freedom 
Press freedom  2007  FH  100 – PF 
Civil 
Liberties 
Civil liberties  2007  FH  8 – CL 
Description: 
There are 8 manifest variables for Social Institutions. The first 6 indicators are contained in the 
Cingranelli-Richards  (CIRI)  Human  Rights  Dataset.  It  contains  standards-based  quantitative 
information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights. 
The last two indicators come from the Freedom House Annual Report, (FH), and have been reversed 
because they were inverse indicators. 
 
Table 1d. Manifest variables for Economic Development (E.D.) 
Name   Variable   Year  Source  Reversion 
Formula 
GDP   GDP per capita   2005  HDR   
Radios  Radios per 1000 people   1997  WRI- ET   
Telephone  Main telephone lines per 1000 people   2005  WRI- ET   
TV  Television sets per 1000 people   2003  WRI- ET   
Energy  Total energy consumption per capita   2005  WRI- ET   
Electricity  Electricity consumption per capita   2005  WRI- ET   
Description: 
There are 6 manifest variables for Economic Development. The first is from the Human Development 
Report – United Nations Development Programme (HDP). 














Table 1e. Manifest variables for Knowledge  (K) 
 
Name  Variable  Year  Source  Reversion 
Formula 
Primary  Primary school gross enrollment ratio   2004  WRI- ET   
Secondary  Secondary school gross enrollment ratio   2004  WRI- ET   
Literacy  Adult literacy rate   2005  HDR   
Tot years  Total school years   2000  BL   
Description: 
There are 4 manifest variables for Knowledge.  
The first two are from the World Resource Institute – Earth Trends Searchable Database (WRI- ET) 
The third is from the Human Development Report – United Nations Development Programme (HDR) 
The last indicator is from Barro and Lee dataset on school enrollment (BL) 
 
Table 1f. Manifest variables for Health (H) 
Name   Variable  Year  Source  Reversion 
Formula  
DPT  Immunization rate for DPT in one-year-olds   2005  WRI- ET   
Expect.  Life expectancy at birth   2005  HDR   
Phys.  Physicians   2004  HDR   
Infant  Infant mortality rate   2005  HDR  1000 – IMR 
Description: 
There are 4 manifest variables for Health. The first is from the World Resource Institute – Earth  
Trends Searchable Database (WRI-ET). The other three are from the Human Development Report – 
United Nations Development  Programme (HDR).  
The last indicator has been reversed in order to obtain a direct indicator of Health. 
 
 
  The structural model consists of linear equations relating the latent variables to 
one another: 
                (2) 
where each   is such that   explains   in the specification of the inner model. The 
structural model must be a causal chain (recursive model) which means that there is no 























Figure 2: The PLS-PM model 
 
 
8. PLS-PM algorithm  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the PLS-PM algorithm and its 
performance indicators; however, a brief outline will be given of the options required in 
order to implement the algorithm, as well as of the obtainable output. We suggest that 
readers interested in gaining a deeper insight refer to Tenenhaus et al. (2005). 
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We have already illustrated our choices for the outer model and for the structural 
relations between LV. The PLS algorithm considers three different options for the outer 
model:  reflective  (meaning  that  the  LV  determine  the  level  of  each  MV),  formative 
(meaning that each MV contributes to the corresponding LV), and MIMIC (a mixture of 
the two: some MV follow a reflective path, others a formative one) . Our choice of the 
reflective  model  stems  from  the  consideration  that  –  for  each  block  -  all  the  chosen 
indicators  reflect  the  same  underlying  construct  and  have  been  chosen  to  be  highly 
correlated: an increase in the latent variable  would cause an increase in all its manifest 
variables. 
The chosen estimation procedure for the outer model computes the standardized 
LV as the weighted linear combination of their standardized MV; as initial weights we 
chose the elements of the first eigenvector. 
  The PLS algorithm works by producing in each iteration the estimates  and 
  of  two  key  sets  of  quantities:  the  outer  weights  ,  namely,  the  theoretical 
coefficients of the simple regressions of each standardized MV on its standardized LV, as 
in equation (1), and the inner weights  , namely, the theoretical coefficients of the 
linear equations specifying the relations between the LV, as in (2). The weights estimated 
in one iteration are used in the subsequent iteration to compute two different estimates of 
the latent variables: the external estimations  , making use of the outer weights: 
                 (3) 
and the internal estimations  , making use of the inner weights: 
                 (4) 
The algorithm then makes use of   to compute a new estimate of the inner weights as 
the estimated regression coefficients obtained by fitting the models: 24 
 
              (5) 
and of   to compute a new estimate of  the outer weights as the estimated regression 
coefficients of the models: 
              (6) 
These estimates are then utilized in the next iteration. The algorithm executes the steps 
outlined above until the estimates of the outer weights become stable.  At this point, the 
final estimations of the outer weights are used to compute the final estimations of the LV 
by  means  of  (3);  lastly,  the  structural  equations  are  estimated  using  individual  OLS 
multiple regressions where the LV are replaced by their estimates, as in (5). 
9.  PLS-PM  validation 
  PLS is a soft modeling procedure, strongly oriented towards prediction. It lacks a 
specific  global  optimization  criterion;  moreover  –  not  being  based  on  distributional 
assumptions concerning joint multivariate distribution and independence of observations 
- traditional parametric-based techniques for significance testing/evaluation would not be 
appropriate. To answer the question: ”to what extent is a PLS model  appropriate to 
describe the interactions between latent constructs?” we need to assess the quality of 
both  the  measurement  model  and  the  structural  model.  Thus  the  results  are  usually 
presented in three steps: 
1) quality of measurement model  
2) quality of structural model 
3) quality of the overall model. 
  Being PLS a variance-based model, strongly oriented towards prediction, model 
validation mainly focuses on the model predictive capability. The first step focuses on the 
reliability and validity of the measures (MV) used. The logic is that if there is not enough 
confidence that the manifest variables  are representing the latent variable, there is little 
sense in using them to validate the theoretical model. The other two steps concern the 
evaluation of the structural model, in particular of its predictive power: of each dependent 
latent variable (of each structural equation) and of the overall performance of the model. 25 
 
  The consistency of the choice of indicators for each block, with the choice of the 
reflective mode - which requires the uni-dimensionality of the blocks - can be assessed by 
the level of Cronbach's alpha index which, for the j-th block  (containing   indicators) 
is defined as: 
            (7) 
This index can be used to check how well a construct is measured by its indicators; it is in 
fact considered an index of a construct’s reliability.  The rule of thumb is that block j and 
(thus construct yj ) is essentially uni-dimensional (and reliable) if  .  
  The quality of the measurement model can be validated through the communality 
index (also indicated as AVE) of each block: 
   
     
  (8) 
and through the average communality index, where the average is extended to all the 
measurement blocks and is weighted with the number of MV in each block: 
      (9) 
The  communality  explains  how  much  of  the  MV’s  variability  in  the  j-th  block  is 
explained by their own LV’s scores. The rule of the thumb is to consider of good quality 
any block with AVE ≥0,5. 
A more detailed set of information takes into account how each indicator relates to each 
latent variable. Indicator reliability specifies which part of an indicator’s variance can be 
explained by the underlying latent variable. A common threshold criterion is that more 
than 50% of a MV’s variance should be explained by the LV. This in turn implies a factor 
loading of the LV on the MV ≥0,7. As a rule of the thumb reflective indicators should be 
eliminated  whenever  their  loadings  (correlations)  are  smaller  than  0,4.  However,  to 
evaluate the association between each MV and its LV, not only should its indicator be 
strongly related to its latent construct, but it should not have stronger association with any 26 
 
other construct. A necessary condition for discriminant validity to hold  for each MV, is 
that its correlation with the construct it should reflect is stronger than its correlation with 
any  other  construct  in  the  model  In  other  words  indicator  loadings  (i.e.  correlations 
between MV and their LV) need to be greater than cross loadings (correlations with other 
LV). 
  A  logical  metric  for  the  evaluation  of  the  structural  model  is  endogenous 
variables’ determination index R
2.  
  As for a global goodness of fit (GoF) criterion, unlike maximum likelihood SEM, 
PLS does not optimize a global scalar function and thus a natural global validation index 
is not readily available. However, an operational solution can be computed as: 
                (10) 
where  
            (11) 
Some authors have proposed comparing the two quantities used to compute the goodness 
of fit with their theoretical maxima. These maxima are conditioned on the given the 
model. The maximum of the average communality is obtained by means of a Principal 
Components Analysis of each block of manifest variables
13. The maximum of the   is  
obtained by means of a Canonical Correlation Analysis of each structural equation.
14. Of 
course, if we were to use Principal Component Analysis for the outer model  then   for 
the  inner  model  would  possibly  decrease;  conversely,  if  we  were  to  use  Canonical 
Correlation between the MV, thus giving rise to the LV belonging to the same structural 
equation, the communality of each LV would probably decrease.  In other words, it is 
impossible to maximize the goodness of fit of the outer and of the inner model at the 
                                                 
13 In particular the maximum communality of a LV is given by  the greatest eigenvalue of the variance 
covariance matrix of  its MV. This means that if we define each LV as the first principal component of its 
MV, the fit for the outer model would be a maximum. 
14 In particular the maximum    of a structural equation  is given by the first 
canonical correlation coefficient between a canonical variable ξj and a canonical variable ξj’; ξj is obtained 
by means of the MV associated with Yj, whereas  ξj’ is obtained by merging all the MV variables associated 
with all the LV explaining Yj. 27 
 
same time. The ratio of the average communality to its maximum is a relative measure of  
goodness of ft  for the outer model, while the ratio of the   to its maximum is a relative 
measure of goodness of fit for the inner model. The product of the two ratios is used as a 
comprehensive relative measure of goodness of fit , and is called relative GoF. 
10. The Results 
Our  primary  concern  has  been  to  define  a  structural  equation  model  connecting  
Economic Institutions to other institutions and to the different components of human 
development. Thus, accordingly, we will first of all discuss the results of the structural 
model. The main results concerning our path model are represented in this diagram: 
 
 
Figure 3: Estimates of the Path Coefficients  
 
while the results for model assessment are presented in tables 4, 5, 6. 
Figure 3 shows the estimates of the path coefficients, namely the coefficients of 
the latent variables in the structural equations model (inner model defined by (2)).   
Recalling that the  latent variables are normalized, the path coefficients are pure 
numbers that quantify the orientation and the strength of the linear structural relations 
between the variables in the inner model. As expected all the coefficients are positive; the 



























of human development (Economic Development, Knowledge, Health). The strong link 
between these two groups lies in the clear relation that joins Economic Institutions with 
Economic Development. Conversely the influence of Social Institutions on Knowledge is  
weaker than we expected.   
First of all let us look at the core equation of our model, the relation between 
Economic Institutions and Economic Development:  
E.D.= 0.854 E.I. 
with goodness of fit index R
2 = 0.729 (see table 2). Economic Institutions have a high 
impact on Economic Development and the assumed relation between these constructs has 
very good predictive capability.   
This was one of the crucial aspects of our model: that demand determines growth, in 
particular  that  institutions  that  imply  government  expenditure  or  that  create  positive 
conditions  for  the  expansion  of  private  investment  determine  economic  development.  
This assumption seems to be very well supported by our data. We will come back to it 
after having validated the outer model, in particular after having checked for  indicator 
reliability, composite reliability and discriminant validity of the manifest variables in 
each block. 
As for the rest of the inner model, on the institutions side we have: 
P.I .= 0.671 E.I .   
S.I. = 0.597P.I .+ 0.344E.I. 
(with R
2= 0.45 and R
2 = 0.75 respectively) 
whereas on the development side: 
K = 0.657E.D .+ 0.142 S.I. 
H = 0.590K. + 0.291E.D. 
with – respectively – R
2 = 0.58 and R
2 = 0.692. 
The path coefficient connecting Social Institutions to Knowledge is fairly low. It could be 
worth estimating a different model without this path. 
Focusing on the validation of the outer model, from table 3 we see that all Cronbach’s 
alphas are high, ranging from  0.771 to 0.938 thus indicating high reliability for all our 
latent variables. 29 
 
Some  communalities  (see  table  2)  are  just  under  the  threshold  value  (Economic 
Institutions and Political Institutions); looking at the manifest variable’s loadings (table 
4), this is due to one or two  low correlations between indicators and latent variable. In 
particular Area 1-A (General government consumption spending as a percentage of total 
consumption ) and Area 4-A (Taxes on international trade ) with Economic Institutions,  
and F (Independent sub-federal units) for Political Institutions. For all three indicators 
discriminant  validity  holds.  However  while  the  first  two  indicators  are  reliable  (in 
statistical validation sense)  the F indicator  instead, is below the threshold of 0.4 and 
should  be  eliminated.  Another  indicator  that  should  be  eliminated  due  to  its  low 
reliability is Primary (Primary school gross enrollment ratio). However, in this case there 
are  sound  reasons  in  favor  of  its  inclusion  in  the  block  (gross  enrollment  ratio  –  a 
combination o primary, secondary and tertiary enrolments - is part of the definition of the 
Education Index as defined by UNDP); moreover the communality for Knowledge is well 
above the critical threshold.  
As for the evaluation of the overall fit (see table 5), having obtained a goodness of 
fit index of 0.615 our model appears to be well supported by the data. The goodness of fit 
is  slightly  better  for  the  outer  model  (relative  index  0.992)  than  for  the  inner  model 
(relative  = 0.887). 
  Concluding our discussion of the results, we can state that the structural model is 
well supported by the data, and so are all the single blocks. The strongest relation is 
between Economic Institutions and Economic Development, which is the core relation of 
our model. It is also worth noticing that Economic Development also has a very high 
correlations  with  all  its  manifest  variables,  and  thus  a  high  communality  index.  Its 
definition by means of the PLS model is particularly well supported by the data. 
 









  Latent 
variable 
Dimensions  Cronbach's 
alpha 
E. I.  Exogenous      0.453    E.I.  9  0.840 
P.I.  Endogenous  0.450  0.450  0.435    P. I.  7  0.771 
S.I.  Endogenous  0.750  0.748  0.654    S. I.  8  0.920 30 
 
E.D.  Endogenous  0.729  0.729  0.764    E. D.  6  0.938 
K  Endogenous  0.580  0.576  0.636    K  4  0.780 
H  Endogenous  0.692  0.689  0.747    H  4  0.885 
Mean    0.640    0.591         
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Table 4:  Indicator’s Loadings and Crossloadings 
   E.I.  P.I.  S.I.  E.D.  K  H 
General government consumption spending as 
a percentage of total consumption 
0.495  0.271  0.318  0.511  0.455  0.268 
Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP  0.635  0.565  0.545  0.614  0.556  0.570 
Government enterprises and investment   0.651  0.539  0.611  0.486  0.451  0.445 
Protection of property rights   0.799  0.376  0.493  0.707  0.469  0.462 
Legal enforcement of contracts   0.582  0.310  0.324  0.565  0.612  0.575 
Taxes on international trade  0.482  0.306  0.399  0.355  0.423  0.437 
Regulatory Trade Barriers  0.825  0.579  0.563  0.686  0.607  0.673 
International capital market controls  0.601  0.477  0.517  0.409  0.412  0.459 
Business Regulations  0.869  0.525  0.636  0.745  0.547  0.562 
Political rights  0.645  0.884  0.879  0.547  0.453  0.497 
Lower legislative  0.294  0.666  0.441  0.182  0.171  0.263 
Upper legislative  0.206  0.423  0.309  0.187  0.243  0.168 
Independent sub-federal units  0.287  0.319  0.261  0.365  0.249  0.186 
Index of democracy  0.694  0.839  0.773  0.664  0.678  0.693 
Polity score  0.353  0.723  0.435  0.270  0.266  0.405 
Executive constraint  0.276  0.562  0.266  0.213  0.202  0.361 
Physical Integrity Index  0.643  0.488  0.745  0.583  0.415  0.438 
Empowerment Rights Index  0.585  0.733  0.913  0.506  0.404  0.388 
Freedom of association  0.392  0.523  0.762  0.336  0.327  0.245 
Women’s economic rights  0.572  0.573  0.709  0.617  0.581  0.570 
Women’s political rights  0.291  0.408  0.521  0.241  0.182  0.172 
Women’s social rights  0.693  0.737  0.875  0.705  0.678  0.630 
Press freedom  0.736  0.822  0.923  0.644  0.507  0.493 
Civil liberties  0.728  0.893  0.932  0.623  0.556  0.567 
GDP per capita   0.867  0.572  0.679  0.952  0.716  0.695 
Radios per 1000 people   0.718  0.574  0.633  0.856  0.696  0.628 
Main telephone lines per 1000 people   0.837  0.638  0.683  0.919  0.757  0.772 
Television sets per 1000 people   0.751  0.524  0.589  0.832  0.714  0.701 
Total energy consumption per capita   0.595  0.300  0.414  0.808  0.471  0.482 
Electricity consumption per capita   0.650  0.409  0.537  0.871  0.526  0.508 
Primary school gross enrollment ratio   0.018  0.033  0.004  -0.036  0.210  0.037 
Secondary school gross enrollment ratio   0.678  0.449  0.536  0.687  0.926  0.745 
Adult literacy rate   0.631  0.511  0.492  0.616  0.923  0.795 
Total school years   0.734  0.549  0.593  0.762  0.888  0.677 
Immunization rate for DPT in one-year-olds   0.426  0.389  0.315  0.461  0.443  0.730 
Life expectancy at birth   0.704  0.554  0.538  0.694  0.741  0.933 
Physicians   0.681  0.579  0.556  0.700  0.745  0.838 





Table 5 Goodness of fit 
  GoF 
Absolute  0.615 
Relative  0.880 
Outer model  0.992 
Inner model  0.887 
     
11.  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper introduces a model for the relations between institutions and human  
development. This subject has been widely treated in the literature on economic growth 
and  development,  and  there  is  general  agreement  around  the  idea  that  human 
development and  institutions are multidimensional and need to be defined as composite 
indicators. We take a further step in this direction and define all the main components of 
human development (Economic Development; Health, Knowledge) and of institutions 
(Economic, Political, Social Institutions) as unobservable, theoretical constructs (latent 
variables).  Moreover,  we  define  the  relations  between  the  components  of  human 
development and of institutions as a system of structural relations instead of  defining a 
single regression model, as in most of the literature. Thus instead of having one single 
relation between a dependent variable human development and one or more independent 
variables  institutions,  we  have  a  system  of  relations  between  several 
endogenous/dependent variables (the components of human development and some of the 
components of  institutions). In fact we have a causal network (path model) in which only 
one variable – Economic Institutions – is defined as exogenous/independent.  
The  aim  of  our  paper  however,  was  to  model  the  relations  between  different 
institutions and different components of human development. To do so we suggest the 
use of SEM – in particular of PLS-PM – and show that the whole procedure provides 
good results. 
In fact having more than one endogenous theoretical latent construct, and more 
than  one  structural  relation,  the  only  possible  statistical  instrument  is  a  structural 
equations model. The next choice that had to be made was between maximum-likelihood 
based  estimation  and  “soft-  modeling”.  Due  to  the  uneven  quality  of  our  data  soft 33 
 
modeling seems a necessary choice; we thus resort to the estimation by means of a PLS 
path-model. 
The  estimated  path  coefficients  and  the  model  validation  indicators  besides 
showing a good fit for the overall model, clearly support our core assumptions: 
i)  that  aggregate  demand  creates  growth,  in  particular  that  what  we  have 
defined as Economic Institutions lead to Economic Development; 
ii)  Economic Institutions positively affect Political and Social Institutions; 
iii)  Economic  Development  generates  a  parallel  process  of  improvement  of 
social conditions, determining Knowledge and Health. 
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